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Happy Tuesday!
Iâm getting into the bad habit of sending these essays whenever I finish them. Maybe itâs a good habit.
This one is about an idea Iâve been thinking about for a while. Over the last few weeks, Iâve read as much as I could in order to try to put some more rigor around it.
The idea is that technology creates means, but that we shouldnât expect it to create meaning. Thatâs up to us.
To realize the amazing present and future we want, we need both means and meaning. I want Not Boring to be about both. This is the manifesto. Read the whole thing here.
Letâs get to it.
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Means and Meaning
I recently read Anna Karenina.
No no, I appreciate it, but please hold your applause. I didnât do it for a medal. Really, it was nothing. Yeah sure itâs like 864 pages of Russian literature or whatever, but Tolstoy is such a magnificent writer it really didnât feel that long. Lots of people have read it. Itâs no big deal, really.
Where was I? Ah, yes.
It struck me, towards the end (Iâm a little slow), that what the book is about is getting what you want and finding yourself asking, âCool, now what?â
I bring this up not to brag â again, lots of people have read Anna Karenina! â but because itâs a theme that, mostly unintentionally, Iâve been playing with in Not Boring over the past few months.
Itâs there in The Return of Magic:
The Return of Magic isnât a rejection of reason and science. Reason and science have gotten us here, and we need science to expand. But we must simultaneously rediscover the wonder and intuition that weâve forgotten, so that we might see the universe as alive, connected, and full of possibilities.
Itâs there in Long Questions/Short Answers:
Actually, fuck answers, the more I think about it. The best questions donât have answers. The point of the question isnât to find an answer. The best questions are organizing principles, magnets, ways of seeing.
Itâs there quite literally in Most Human Wins:
In the AI bull case Roon and Elon discuss, when sufficiently smart AI can do anything humans can and more, AI will cure cancer, improve crop yields, and speed up travel.
Humans, in our divine discontent, will say, âCool, now what?â
Now what? is the fundamental question of the modern era.
To be certain, it is an old question. Anna Karenina is not a new book.
Before Tolstoy, Aristotle distinguished between âinstrumental goodsâ like wealth, tools, and health and âintrinsic goodsâ like virtue, contemplation and friendship. He argued that contemplative life (bios theoretikos) was the highest form of human activity because it was meaningful in itself, and that the active life (bios praktikos) was necessary but subordinate.
The Ancient Greeks, however, assumed scarcity. For them, having enough instrumental goods was a prerequisite for philosophical contemplation. Recall Maslowâs Hierarchy: humans need their basic needs covered before they can spend time on self-actualization.
We, however, live in an age of abundance. And contra Maslow, it doesnât seem to be making us more actualized. We have not filled our lives with meaning and contemplation.
It turns out that instead of Maslowâs linear progression, there is a complex dynamic relationship between instrumental goods and intrinsic goods, the active life and the contemplative life, or physiological needs and self-actualization.
âAgain I tell you,â preached Jesus, âit is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God.â
More generally, the greater our means, the harder it may be to find meaning.
Why? Anna Karenina might suggest a mechanism: there is thrill in striving. Purpose in striving. Even those who have put in decades of work are overcome by a sense of melancholy when they finally achieve their aim.
Michael Phelps felt lost and depressed after his 2012 Olympics, perhaps the greatest of all time. Harper Lee barely published after the overwhelming success of To Kill a Mockingbird. J.K. Rowling compared her sense of loss upon completing the Harry Potter series to bereavement. In Losing My Virginity, Richard Branson shared that business successes left him feeling unexpectedly empty.
Now what?
Now, it is easier than ever to get what we want, or what we think we want, or a simulacrum of something that simulates what we want. Want adoration? Get 1,000 likes on a tweet. Want riches? Build the fastest company ever to reach $100 million in ARR. Want the answer? Ask AI. Want to get skinny? Take Ozempic.
Technologyâs magic is that it can produce means. It lets people do more with less. Technology, however, cannot provide meaning. In fact, the greater our technological powers, the more challenging and urgent our search for meaning becomes.
But just because it is harder does not doom it to impossibility. The inverse relationship is not deterministic. Means and meaning were never perfect substitutes.
Here, modern philosophers correctly diagnose the problems of modernity but leave a big, pessimistic hole when it comes to solutions.
Byung-Chul Han calls ours The Burnout Society. âThe capitalist economy absolutizes survival,â Han writes. âIt is not concerned with the good life. It is sustained by the illusion that more capital produces more life, which means a greater capacity for living.â
That is not an illusion! Itâs just incomplete.
Capital can support more life, which means a greater capacity for living.
My working model for the meaning of life is based on the Perennial Philosophy, that weâre all a piece of a universal consciousness, the One knowing itself, and in this model more people having more unique experiences is the point.
But simply because capitalism produces more life, which means a greater capacity for living does not guarantee that we are fully utilizing that capacity. That is up to us.
And it is hard to argue that we are utilizing that full capacity. We have both greater means and less meaning.
This is the great challenge of the modern era, and of all future eras: to shrink the gap between means and meaning as our means continue to grow.
Whatever You Wish
One of my favorite speculative essays of all-time is Isaac Asimovâs Whatever You Wish, which begins:
The difficulty in deciding on what the professions of the future would be is that it all depends on the kind of future we choose to have. If we allow our civilization to be destroyed, the only profession of the future will be scrounging for survival, and few till succeed at it.
Suppose, though, that we keep our civilization alive and flourishing and, therefore, that technology continues to advance.
Asimovâs belief, then, is opposed to Hanâs. A flourishing society means one with technological advancement.
In such a future, he imagines, the logical jobs like âcomputer programming, lunar mining, fusion engineering, space construction, laser communications, neurophysiology, and so onâ wonât actually be necessary. Robots will do all of that for us. So what will we do?
Consider that there have been times in history when an aristocracy lived in idleness off the backs of flesh-and-blood machines called slaves or serfs or peasants. When such a situation was combined with a high culture, however, aristocrats used their leisure to become educated in literature, the arts, and philosophy. Such studies were not useful for work, but they occupied the mind, made for interesting conversation and an enjoyable life.
These were the liberal arts, arts for free men who didn't have to work with their hands. And these were considered higher and more satisfying than the mechanical arts, which were merely materially useful.
Perhaps, then, the future will see a world aristocracy supported by the only slaves that can humanely serve in such a postâsophisticated machines. And there will be an infinitely newer and broader liberal arts program, taught by the teaching machines, from which each person could choose.
Asimov was, perhaps, inspired by Aristotle. In The Scent of Time (2017), Han writes:
Aristotle distinguished between three kinds of life. A free man may choose between them. The highest form of life is the bios theoretikos, a life dedicated to contemplation. As a free man, the master does not come into direct contact with the resistance exerted by things, as he leaves all work to the slave. This freedom enables him to have an entirely different relationship to the world, one that is not determined by the world as an object of work or domination. The contemplative relationship to things presupposes freedom from work. It interrupts the time that is work. According to Aristotle, the vita contemplativa is divine because it does not suffer any compulsion and is free from any interest.
Work is necessary. Humanity needs means to survive. But per both Asimov and Aristotle, if others do the work for us, we are free to live a richer, more divine contemplative life. A life of leisure, as Han describes in his 2023 book, Vita Contemplativa:
The activity of the God, âwhich surpasses all others in blessednessâ, is contemplative activity (theoretike),â The activity of contemplation is an inactivity, a contemplative calmness, leisure (schole) to the extent that, unlike active life (bios politikos), it does not act; that is, it does not have its purpose outside of itself. In its inactivity, its leisure, life relates to itself. Life is no longer estranged from itself. Aristotle therefore associates bios theoretikos with self-sufficiency: âAnd the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity.â Only vita contemplativa promises divine self-sufficiency and perfect blessedness.
This is the leisure of St. Augustine â âThe attraction of a life of leisure ought not to be the prospect of lazy inactivity, but the chance for the investigation and discovery of truth.â â and to ground it in reality, the leisure the great Indian mathematician Ramanujan sought, not for no purpose, but to dedicate himself to his math:
What he wanted, Ramanujan replied, was a pittance on which to live and work. Or, as Ramachandra Rao later put it, âHe wanted leisure, in other words, simple food to be provided to him without exertion on his part, and that he should be allowed to dream on.â
He wanted leisure . . . The word leisure has undergone a shift since the time Ramachandra Rao used it in this context. Today, in phrases like leisure activity or leisure suit, it implies recreation or play. But the word actually goes back to the Middle English leisour, meaning freedom or opportunity. And as the Oxford English Dictionary makes clear, itâs freedom not from but âto do something specified or impliedâ [emphasis added]. Thus, E. T. Bell writes of a famous seventeenth-century French mathematician, Pierre de Fermat, that he found in the Kingâs service âplenty of leisureââleisure, that is, for mathematics.
So it was with Ramanujan. It was not self-indulgence that fueled his quest for leisure; rather, he sought freedom to employ his gifts. In his Report on Canara, Malabar and Ceded Districts, Thackeray spoke of the âleisure, independence and high idealsâ that had propelled Britain to its cultural heights. The European âgentleman of leisure,â free from the need to earn a livelihood, presumably channeled his time and energy into higher moral and intellectual realms. Ramanujan did not belong to such an aristocracy of birth, but he claimed membership in an aristocracy of the intellect. In seeking âleisure,â he sought nothing more than what thousands born to elite status around the world took as their due.
It is the type of leisure that Asimov envisioned: that we will all be technologically-enabled Ramanujans, if not in skill then in desire.
Won't people choose to do nothing? Sleep their lives away?
If that's what they want, why not?âExcept that I have a feeling they won't. Doing nothing is hard work, and, it seems to me, would be indulged in only by those who have never had the opportunity to evolve out of themselves something more interesting and, therefore, easier to do.
Thereâs this funny quirk in sci-fi where its authors imagined technologies like flying cars, robots, fusion, and AI, but not social media. They pictured us largely being⌠us, but with better technological capabilities. With more means, and the same meaning.
David Foster Wallace, however, saw what was coming. Our relationship with media and technology, and with our ability to pay attention, suffused his work.
Infinite Jest featured The Entertainment, a videotape so compelling people just watched it until they died. Something to Do With Paying Attention has everything to do with paying attention. And in a conversation with Rolling Stoneâs David Lipsky, during a five-day road trip at the end of his Infinite Jest book tour that would become a book, which became a movie, DFW addressed the challenge head-on:
DFW: And that as the Internet grows, and as our ability to be linked up, likeâI mean, you and I coulda done this through e-mail, and I never woulda had to meet you, and that woulda been easier for me. Right? Like, at a certain point weâre gonna have to build up some machinery, inside our guts, to help us deal with this. Because the technology is just gonna get better and better and better and better. And itâs gonna get easier and easier, and more and more convenient, and more and more pleasurable, to be alone with images on a screen, given to us by people who do not love us but want our money. Which is all right. In low doses, right? but if thatâs the basic main staple of your diet, youâre gonna die. In a meaningful way, youâre going to die.
Lipsky: But you developed some defenses?
DFW: No. This is the great thing about it, is that probably each generation has different things that force the generation to grow up. Maybe for our grandparents it was World War Two. You know? For us, itâs gonna be that at, at a certain point, that weâre either gonna have to put away childish things and discipline ourself about how much time do I spend being passively entertained? And how much time do I spend doing stuff that actually isnât all that much fun minute by minute, but that builds certain muscles in me as a grown-up and a human being? And if we donât do that, then (a) as individuals, weâre gonna die, and (b) the cultureâs gonna grind to a halt.
Did you skip over the block quote? Donât. Go back and read it. Pay attention.
DFWâs 1996 prediction must have seemed prescient when The New Inquiry posted it as an excerpt in 2010. It feels downright clairvoyant in 2025.
When he said that, in 1996, only 16.4 in every 100 Americans used the internet. Today, 93.1 out of 100 of us do.
In 1996, when they finally connected to the ânet after waiting dozens of seconds for their 28.8k modems to dial up, those pioneering netizens found websites that looked like thisâŚ
Or thisâŚ
While it might surprise a modern reader that Pepsiâs website was so much radder than Appleâs, it shouldnât. Back then, PepsiCo was worth $45.6 billion. Apple was worth only $2.6 billion.
Today, PepsiCo is worth $184.3 billion, good for a respectable 4x over the period. Apple, meanwhile, has grown its value 1,207x to $3.14 trillion, with a T, thanks in large part to the fact that it has put an internet-superhighway-connected-supercomputer in all of our pockets.
According to Business of Apps, 155 million Americans own an iPhone (and most of the rest own Android pocket internet-superhighway-connected-supercomputers). More than 5x more people carry an internet computer with them everywhere they go today than used the internet at all in 1996. We millions connect to the internet at something like 1,000 - 70,000x faster speeds than we did in 1996.
And our pocket computers not simply to passively consume entertainment, but to scroll apps that actively consume us.
Each of us has our own addiction. Some scroll Instagram. The kids like TikTok. My drug of choice is Twitter.
I deleted Twitter from my phone a couple weeks ago. Again, hold your applause. I do this sometimes. I always come back, but right now, Iâm pretty pleased with myself. That weekend, I hung out with my family and went to the FIFA World Club Cup Finals and so wasnât at my computer, and therefore not on Twitter. On Monday, when I signed on for the first time in over 24 hours, I was greeted with âRecent postâ notifications in my feed, which, presumably, if Iâd had the app installed and notifications on, would have pinged me, luring me back.
Later that day, Elon Musk announced that xAI/X launched Companion Mode in SuperGrok.
Companion Mode is AI waifus and AI Chads, animated avatar experiences currently exclusive to iOS users who subscribe to SuperGrok Heavy for $300 a month. Those who fork over 25% more than the per capita Gross National Income of Burundi each month can both speak to the avatar and hear her respond. And watch her respond. The animations sync, creating an immersive, spoken conversation feel. Mike Solana wrote about the implications in Goonpocalypse.
The internet is no longer a thing we can choose to distract ourselves with. It is its own organism with its own desires, and chief among those desires is to wrest our attention away from us.
DFW was right. The technology got better and better and better and better, and easier and easier, and more and more convenient, and more and more pleasurable, to be alone with images on a screen, given to us by people who do not love us but want our money.
Asimov was probably right, too, that we wonât sleep our lives away. And, technically, he might have been right that people wonât choose to do nothing. He assumed choice. He didnât know about social media, and he didnât know about Companion Mode.
Neither did Jean Baudrillard, but he certainly anticipated them.
In 1981, the French philosopher published Simulacra and Simulation, in which he argues that in contemporary society, we live in a world of simulations that have become more real than reality itself, that have irreversibly replaced reality.
To give you some sense of his view, the book inspired The Matrix, but Baudrillard himself didnât like The Matrix, because it allowed for the possibility that there was any underlying reality to return to at all.
To Baudrillard, we've moved so far beyond the original referent that the very concept of an authentic, underlying reality has become meaningless. We live in hyperreality: a world in which Disneyland, television, consumer brands, and media representations actually constitute reality.
We photograph meals to craft an image of our lives. Instead of being present at the meal with friends, our mind is in the internet. The Instagram post becomes more real than the meal itself.
Within an hour of this weekâs Blackstone shooting, people (bots?) began tweeting their theories that it was a âfalse flagâ operation, because BlackRock was actually founded out of Blackstone and the shooter reportedly yelled, conveniently, âFree Palestine!â The shooting became more about the conspiracies than the victims.
When the Astronomer CEO was caught on Coldplay camera canoodling with the companyâs head of HR, the story became the memes. Only the Ăźbermeme, Gwenyth Paltrowâs Thank You For Your Interest in Astronomer, could resolve the situation. It was never, of course, about the actual people cheating or being cheated on.
In each case, the simulation doesn't just represent reality but becomes it. This is what Baudrillard meant by hyperreality.
Baudrillard's is not a purely anti-technological position.
What set him off in the first place was the May 1968 student and worker uprising in France that nearly brought down de Gaulleâs government. Radical on the surface, he was appalled by how quickly and totally it was absorbed and neutralized by the media and consumer system. Its revolutionary symbols were immediately commodified, its radical energy channeled into lifestyle consumption, its political demands transformed into cultural products. Think ChĂŠ t-shirts and posters, adorned by would-be revolutionaries who will never revolt. The system didnât need to defeat the revolution by force; it simulated revolution so effectively that real revolution became impossible to distinguish from its media representation.
Certainly, though, Baudrillard would not be surprised to see people yelling at and talking dirty to bots. He wrote that there are âthree orders of simulacraâ (simulacra (n): a copy or representation that no longer refers to any original reality but instead becomes a self-contained truth in a hyperreal realm):
Simulacra that are natural, naturalist, founded on the image, on imitation and counterfeit, that are harmonious, optimistic, and that aim for the restitution or the ideal institution of nature made in Godâs image;
Simulacra that are productive, productivist, founded on energy, force, its materialization by the machine and in the whole system of productionâa Promethean aim of a continuous globalization and expansion, of an indefinite liberation of energy (desire belongs to the utopias related to this order of simulacra);
Simulacra of simulation, founded on information, the model, the cybernetic gameâtotal operationality, hyperreality, aim of total control.
It is not, he would argue, that we are spending too much time scrolling social media and gooning to AI Companions instead of spending time in the real world, but that social media and AI companions have become the real world, or the hyperreal world. They form our reality.
These third-order simulacra are, like Infinite Jestâs Entertainment (and there is evidence that DFW both read and taught Baudrillard), so alluring and so devoid of meaning that even as we create the means (second-order simulacra) to give ourselves more time for meaning, we will instead get sucked, inevitably and irreversibly, further and further into the simulation.
On our current path, many will take the time afforded to them by the miracles of modern capitalism and fake jobs and sleepwalk through life glued to increasingly alluring screens.
Diagnosis Without Cure
So what do we do?
Modern critical theorists are frustratingly empty here. They identify problems but provide very little in the way of practical solutions.
Han is devastatingly good at diagnosis and frustratingly weak on cures. He proposes a return to the vita contemplativa, thinking to think, reflecting on beauty, and the like. It feels like a call to withdraw from society and the economy (especially the economy) in order to contemplate. Ironically, in doing so, he embodies the uselessness of vita contemplativa without vita activa.
This is a uselessness Han himself touches on, briefly, almost as if acknowledging the necessity of the vita activa to fend off critique without dwelling on it long enough to taint the purity of the vita contemplativa. He cites Meister Eckhart and quotes Gregory the Great:
Be aware: while a good plan for life requires that one moves from the active to the contemplative life, it is often useful if the soul returns from the contemplative to the active life, in such a way that the flame of contemplation which has been lit in the heart passes on all its perfection to activity. Thus, active life must lead us to contemplation, but contemplation must set out from what we inwardly considered and call us back to activity.
âA vita contemplativa without acting is blind,â Han admits, âa vita activa without contemplation is empty.â
This is the tension at the heart of The Glass Bead Game, which Herman Hesse began writing in Germany as the Nazis were rising to power and completed during World War II. The book follows Joseph Knecht, a brilliant young man who is recruited to Castalia, a secluded intellectual province dedicated to pure learning and the mysterious Glass Bead Game from which the book gets its title, and rises to become its master, the Magister Ludi.
Hesseâs Castalians proudly engage in the most useless work possible, the purely theoretical, on purpose, in order to avoid the taint of reality. Similarly, Han proposes contemplation outside of capitalism, because contemplation in the service of productivity is a form of auto-exploitation that defeats its purpose.
What Knecht realizes (spoiler alert), but Han fails to, is that pure intellectual contemplation is meaningless without a connection to actual human life and responsibility. As he tells his friend and Castalian colleague, Tegularius:
Your love for culture and the products of the mind does you credit. But it happens that cultural creativity is something we cannot participate in quite so fully as some people think.
A dialogue of Plato's or a choral movement by Heinrich Isaac â in fact all the things we call a product of the mind or a work of art or objectified spirit â are the outcomes of a struggle for purification and liberation. They are, to use your phrase, escapes from time into timelessness, and in most cases the best such works are those which no longer show any signs of the anguish and effort that preceded them.
It is a great good fortune that we have these works, and of course we Castalians live almost entirely by them; the only creativity we have left lies in preserving them. We live permanently in that realm beyond time and conflict embodied in those very works and which we would know nothing of, but for them. And we go even further into the realms of pure mind, or if you prefer, pure abstraction: in our Glass Bead Game we analyze those products of the sages and artists into their components, we derive rules and patterns of form from them, and we operate with these abstractions as though they were building blocks.
Of course all this is very fine; no one will contend otherwise. But not everyone can spend his entire life breathing, eating, and drinking nothing but abstractions. History has one great strength over the things a Waldzell tutor feels to be worthy of his interest: it deals with reality. Abstractions are fine, but I think people also have to breathe air and eat bread.
In the end, Knecht chooses to leave Castalia and re-engage with the real world. I will leave it to you to read how that turns out.
Baudrillard would have laughed at Knechtâs naive attempt to take the Red Pill and leave the Castalian Matrix. Both life inside Castalia and life outside, to Baudrillard, would be mere simulacra. When it comes to solutions, the Frenchman makes Han look like a bushy-tailed optimist.
He spends the last chapter of Simulacra and Simulation, On Nihilism, making the case that classical nihilism is no longer pessimistic enough.
Nihilism! Nihilism requires that there be truth, meaning, or reality to reject. Baudrillard says that truth, meaning, and reality no longer exist! They, too, have been replaced by simulacra.
He ends the book with this uplifting message:
There is no hope for meaning. And without a doubt this is a good thing: meaning is mortal. But that on which it has imposed its ephemeral reign, what it hoped to liquidate in order to impose the reign of the Enlightenment, that is, appearances, they, are immortal, invulnerable to the nihilism of meaning or nonmeaning itself.
This is where seduction begins.
Enjoy the simulation, because itâs all we have left.
But meaning here has a very specific connotation. It refers to the Enlightenment project of rational interpretation, the idea that phenomena point to deeper truths and systematic representations. Meaning as signification, the entire apparatus of rational analysis that treats the world as a text to be read. It is, to borrow from Iain McGilchrist, left-brain thinking.
I think this ending, intentionally or not, points to the way out.
Because meaning in the way that we normally use it, and certainly in the way that Iâm using it, is almost precisely the opposite of meaning in the Baudrillardian / Enlightenment sense. It is right-brained: not analyzing reality but being moved by it, not understanding our place in the system but experiencing our aliveness within it. It is what makes life feel worthwhile, even magical.
Philosopher of technology Albert Borgmann makes a diagnosis similar to Hanâs and Baudrillardâs. His âdevice paradigmâ calls out that modern technology transforms everything into optimized, efficient systems that deliver commodified experiences while hiding the underlying reality. But unlike Han and Baudrillard, Borgmann offers a way forward.
In Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, he writes (emphasis mine):
As long as we overlook the tightly patterned character of technology and believe that we live in a world of endlessly open and rich opportunities, as long as we ignore the definite ways in which we, acting technologically, have worked out the promise of technology and remain vaguely enthralled by that promise, so long simple things and practices will seem burdensome, confining, and drab. But if we recognize the central vacuity of advanced technology, that emptiness can become the opening for focal things. It works both ways, of course. When we see a focal concern of ours threatened by technology, our sight for the liabilities of mature technology is sharpened.
I read this as: if we mistake means for meaning, if we believe that we will find meaning in the next technological breakthrough, we will ignore the things that provide real meaning as boring and antiquated. But if we realize that technology itself cannot provide meaning, then we can focus on the things that can.
If we have reached the simulationâs end-game, as Baudrillard would almost certainly argue we are with AGI or even its Companion facsimile, and it has not created meaning, then we can put technology in its right place as something that provides means and get on with the hard work of creating our own meaning.
We can engage with that existential question: Cool, now what?
Something To Do With Paying Attention
No, seriously, now what?
The problem with philosophers like Han and Baudrillard, too, is that theyâre all analysis and no soul. For the soul, we need writers, people willing to engage with the billions of individual people who make up the systems.
And their answer has something to do with paying attention.
Something To Do With Paying Attention, a novella hidden within DFWâs unfinished The Pale King which heâd considered publishing as a standalone work, is one of my favorite things Iâve ever read. Itâs a beautiful onion. You should read it (itâs short), and I donât want to spoil it for you, but frankly, I think it would be impossible. A simulacra of DFW will never approach the real thing. My real concern here is that I wonât do it justice, because itâs both about attention and a meta-commentary on attention, as in, youâve got to pay close attention to the book to really get it.
Anyway, the book is about a self-described wastoid who we apparently discover in The Pale King is Chris Fogle, aka âIrrelevant Chrisâ and his journey from wastoid to IRS accountant.
Irrelevant Chris throws his away for most of his life â âI tended to realize again that I wasnât even really aware of what was going on, most of the time. Like taking the train instead of actually driving yourself somewhere and having to know where you were and making decisions about where to turnâ â until, at 24, an accidental lecture from a Jesuit accountant, which hits him in just the right spot at just the right time, given the macro and micro circumstances of his life (his accountant father had died in a subway accident; his recent realization, upon hearing âYouâre watching As the World Turns,â âthat whatever a potentially âlost soulâ was, I was oneâand it wasnât cool or funny.â) he takes control of his own attention and directs it towards obtaining a career at the Internal Revenue Service.
The macro and micro circumstances, plus the Jesuit substitute accounting professorâs bearing and speech â âGentlemen, prepare to wear the hat. You have wondered, perhaps, why all real accountants wear hats? They are todayâs cowboys. As you will be. Riding the American range. Riding herd on the unending torrent of financial data. The eddies, cataracts, arranged variations, fractious minutiae. You order the data, shepherd it, direct its flow, lead it where itâs needed, in the codified form in which itâs apposite. You deal in facts, gentlemen, for which there has been a market since man first crept from the primeval slurry. It is youâtell them that. Who ride, man the walls, define the pie, serve. Gentlemen, you are called to accountâ â wake Irrelevant Chris up â George Saunders calls DFW, in a tribute, a âwake-up artistâ â and fill him with panic, that heâs figured it out too late, that he wonât be able to pay for more college, particularly now that his father canât pay for it, now that he finally actually wants to stay in college, so he can complete all of the courses that he needs to complete, and actually learn all that he needs to learn, for a career in the IRS, which he was drawn to as one of a common type of person who are âalmost a special kind of psychological type, probably. Itâs not a very common typeâperhaps one in 10,000âbut the thing is that the sort of person of this type who decides that he wants to enter the Service really, really wants to and becomes very determined, and will be hard to put off once heâs focused in on his real vocation and begun to be actively drawn to it,â but now that heâs focused on this real vocation, now that heâs started paying attention, the solution to his financial situation wrt college payments finds him.
Maybe he heard about the IRSâ aggressive recruiting drive on WBBM-AM, but he also has a âpartial memory of actually first seeing an advertisement for this recruitment program in a sudden, dramatic way that now, in retrospect, seems so heavily fateful and dramatic that perhaps it is more the memory of a dream or fantasy I had at the time.â
âAnyhow, according to this memory,â (I love this, according to this memory, which those four words make seem like not quite his, or certainly not in his control, but which he faithfully reproduces anyway), âI was sitting at one of the many stylized plastic tables in the Galaxy Mallâs food court, looking absently down at the tableâs pattern of star-and-moon shaped perforations, and saw, through one such perforation, a portion of the Sun-Times that someone had evidently discarded on the floor beneath the table, which was open to the Business Classified section, and in the memory involves seeing this from above the table in such a way that a beam of light from the food courtâs overhead lighting far above fell through one of the star- shaped perforations in the tabletop and illuminatedâas if by symbolically star-shaped spotlight or ray of lightâone particular advertisement among all the pageâs other ads and notices of business and career opportunities, this being a notice about the IRSâs [note: Iâm realizing I used IRSâ earlier] new recruitment-incentive program under way in some sections of the country, of which the Chicagoland area was one.â
To me, this sounds like a synchronicity â âa meaningful coincidence that suggests an underlying pattern or connection beyond normal causality,â first coined by Jung â but Irrelevant Chris calls it âanother illustration of how motivationally âprimedâ I seemed to be, in retrospect, for a career in the service.â
Synchronicity or motivationally primed, it is the type of thing that you can only notice if youâre paying attention, which is pretty much the point of the novella.
Iâm not sure if he did this on purpose, although Iâm sure he did because it was DFW, these revelations make you realize that you, the reader, werenât really paying attention, either. That although Chris was a self-described wastoid, although he seemed to be much more like his account father, who was always âsqueezing his shoes,â than his mother, who was always defending him, he was actually more like his father, deep down in his genes, than either of them would have admitted; he was destined to become an accountant, once he started paying attention.
Right there, on page 11, in what seems to be just another example of his waistoidness and his motherâs sticking up for him despite or because of that, Chris recounts âthe past trouble Iâd had with reading in primary school when weâd lived in Rockford and my father had worked for the City of Rockford. This was in the mid-1960s, at Machesney Elementary. I went through a sudden period where I couldnât read. I mean that I actually couldnât readâmy mother knew I could read from when weâd read childrenâs books together. But for almost two years at Machesney, instead of reading something Iâd count the words in it [emphasis mine, with the benefit of hindsight], as though reading was just the same as counting the words. For example, âHere came Old Yeller, to save me from the hogsâ would equate to ten words which I would count off from one to ten instead of its being a sentence that made you love Old Yeller in the book even more.â
This accountantâs tic shows up throughout the novella; he learns to read again, but heâs always counting at the same time. âFor instance,â he says on the next page, âIâve said 2,752 words right now since I started,â adding, with an accountantâs precision, âMeaning 2,752 words before I said, âIâve said,â versus 2,754 if you count âIâve saidâ â which I do, still.â Later, during the Jesuit substitute accounting professorâs rousing ode to accountants, he admits, âIt suddenly occurred to me that I had no idea how many words heâd spoken since that 8,206th one at the conclusion of the review.â It took a speech on accounting to command his full attention, which had always been at least partially divided by word counting. Later still, however, in the IRS recruiting office, heâs counting again: âOverall, despite comprising scarcely more than 5,750 total words, the initial recruiting presentation lasted almost three hoursâŚâ Attention is something that needs to be constantly directed.
Thereâs this one spot next to which I scribbled âso goodâ in the margin, mid-Jesuit substitute accountingâs speech, when he wrote/Chris said, âHowever transfixed I still was, I was also aware [aware], by this point, that the substituteâs metaphors seemed to be getting a bit jumbledâit was hard to imagine the remaining orientals making much sense of cowboys and pies, since they were specifically American images.â Now that I write it, though, even that speaks to awareness. Heâd become, during the speech, so aware as to not get fully swept up in its emotions. Like an accountant might avoid getting swept up in emotions, I guess.
The speechâs impact on him, which like the newspaper classified seemed directed right at him, was itself a payoff on a long trademark DFW digression a few pages earlier, in which he pokes holes in his Chrisitan roommateâs born-again Christian girlfriendâs story of being saved, when, lost and hopeless â âFervent Christians are always remembering themselves asâand thus, by extension, judging everyone else outside their sect to beâlost and hopeless and just barely clinging to any kind of interior sense of value or reason to go on living, before they were âsavedââ â âdriving around in one of her parentsâ AMC Pacer, until, for no particular reason she was aware of inside herself, she turned suddenly into the parking lot of what turned out to be an evangelical Churchâ [fuckkk no way. is this a callback to / refutation of his earlier point that driving and turning requires awareness unlike riding a train? it couldnât be⌠unlessâŚ] âwhich by coincidence happened to be right in the middle of holding an evangelical service, andâfor what she again claimed was no discernible reason or motive she could have namedâshe wandered aimlessly in and sat down in the rear of the church in one of the plushly cushioned theater-type seats their churches tend to use instead of wooden pews, and just as she sat down, the preacher or father or whatever they called them there evidently said, âThere is someone out there with us in the congregation today that is feeling lost and hopeless and at the end of their rope and needs to know that Jesus loves them very, very much,â and thenâin the social room, recounting her storyâthe girlfriend testified as to how she had been stunned and deeply moved, and said she had instantly felt a huge, dramatic spiritual change deep inside of her in which she said she felt completely reassured and unconditionally known and loved, and as though now suddenly her life had meaning and direction to it after all, and so on and so forth, and that furthermore she had not known a down or empty moment since, not since the pastor or father or whatever picked just that moment to reach out past all the other evangelical Christians sitting there fanning themselves with complimentary fans with slick full-color ads for the church on them and to just kind of verbally nudge them aside out of the way and somehow address himself directly to the girlfriend and her circumstances at just that moment of spiritual need,â which of course annoyed Irrelevant Chris at the time, and after hearing which he asked her âjust what exactly had made her think the evangelical pastor was talking to her directly, meaning her in particular, as probably everyone else sitting there in the church audience probably felt the same way she did, as pretty much every red-blooded American in todayâs (then) late-Vietnam and Watergate era felt desolate and disillusioned and unmotivated and directionless and lost, and that that if the preacher or fatherâs [note: he drops âor whateverâ for this one] saying âSomeone lost and hopelessâ was tantamount to those Sun-Times horoscopes that are specially designed to be so universally obvious that they always give their horoscope readers that special eerie feeling of particularity and insight, exploiting the psychological fact that most people are narcissistic and prone to the illusion that they and their problems are uniquely special and that if theyâre feeling a certain way theyâre surely the only person who is feeling like that. In other words, I was only pretending to ask her a questionâI was actually giving the girlfriend a condescending little lecture on peopleâs narcissism and the illusion of uniqueness, like the fat industrialist in Dickens or Ragged Dick who leans back from a great dinner with his fingers laced over his huge stomach and cannot imagine how anyone in that moment could be hungry anywhere in the whole world,â but which then of course Chris has almost the exact same experience, priest and all, with the Jesuit substitute accounting teacher.
Itâs less a story of uniqueness, he realizes, and more a story of awareness, or the awareness that unique circumstances create which in turn makes the message unique to the receiver even if they can be equally unique to other receivers. Or as he says, âAnyhow, it seems like a very long time ago. But the point of even remembering the conversation, I think, is that there was an important fact behind the Christian girlâs âsalvationâ story which I simply hadnât understood at the timeâand, to be honest, I donât think she or the Christian did, either. Itâs true that her story was stupid and dishonest, but that doesnât mean the experience she had in the church that day didnât happen, or that its effect on her wasnât real. Iâm not putting it very well, but I was both right and wrong about her little story. I think the truth is probably that enormous, sudden, dramatic, unexpected, life-changing experiences are not translatable or explainable to anyone else, and this is because they really are unique and particularâthough not unique in the way the Christian girl believed. This is because their power isnât just the result of the experience itself, but also of the circumstances in which it hits you, of everything in your previous life-experience which has led up to it and made you exactly who and what you are when the experience hits you. Does that make any sense? Itâs hard to explain. What the girl with the meadow on her boots had left out of the story was why she was feeling so especially desolate and lost right then, and thus why she was so psychologically âprimedâ to hear the pastorâs general, anonymous comment in that personal way.â
All of which seems like a non-sequitur at the time of reading, but which pays off when Chris absentmindedly walks into the wrong buildingâs room 311 and wonders whether it âmight not have been one more bit of unconscious irresponsibility on my part.â
âYou cannot analyze sudden, dramatic experiences like this this way, thoughâespecially in hindsight, which is notoriously tricky (though I obviously did not understand this during the exchange with the Christian girl in the boots).â
What matters isnât the specific words or experiences. Each person can hear them or experience them in totally unique ways. What matters is how you, in that moment, in the midst of a lifetime of words and experiences, hear or experience them, which just has something to do with paying attention.
Attention is All You Need
My takeaway from Something To Do With Paying Attention is that the exact same situation can provide completely different meaning to different people depending on whether and how each is paying attention.
This is the death of meaning in the Enlightenment / Baudrillardian sense. There is no way to run a scientific experiment that determines who will respond to what how.
This is the birth of meaning in the sense that weâre talking about.
Take running. In Simulation and Simulacra, Baudrillard decries it as a Disneyland-like simulacra: âThey no longer walk, but they go jogging, etc.â Borgmann, on the other hand, includes running as an example of a focal practice: a sustained and engaging human activity that orients life by fostering competence, excellence, and a way of life that shelters meaningful focal concerns through regular and mindful participation:
The great run, where one exults in the strength of one's body, in the ease and the length of the stride, where nature speaks powerfully in the hills, the wind, the heat, where one takes endurance to the breaking point, and where one is finally engulfed by the good will of the spectators and the fellow runners.
Same activity, two very different ways of paying attention to it. Crucially, how you look at running, how you pay attention to it, shapes how you relate to the world in that moment. If you view it as a vapid simulacrum of walking, you will find yourself overwhelmed by the sheer stupidity of it all every time you chance upon someone out for a jog. If you view it as a way for a human to focus his mind and body against a hard task, you will find yourself impressed by human capacity each time you watch a runner zip by. The experience is more impactful, of course, if youâre the one running.
This is a little thing, but I think that meaning consists of the way you pay attention to millions or billions of little things.
And I think that one of the reasons that with more means, we seem to find less meaning, is that means give you permission to pay less attention.
In The World Beyond Your Head, Matthew Crawford compares the old Mickey Mouse cartoons to the more modern Mickey Mouse Clubhouse:
In the old Mickey Mouse cartoons from the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, by far the most prominent source of hilarity is the capacity of material stuff to generate frustration, or rather demonic violence. Fold-down beds, ironing boards, waves at the beach, trailers (especially when Goofy is at the wheel of the towing vehicle, on a twisty mountain road), anything electric, anything elastic, anything that can become a projectile. Anything that can suffer termite damage that remains hidden until the crucial moment. Springs are especially treacherous, as are retractable blinds. Snowballs can be counted on to grow by a couple orders of magnitude on their way down the slope toward your head. At any given moment, the odds of being seized by the collar by a severely overwound grandfather clock are nontrivial. Icicles: donât stand anywhere near them. Bicycles tend to become unicycles, unpredictably, and rubber cement is easily mistaken for baking powder. Why do they have nearly identical labels?
âThose early cartoons,â Crawford writes, âpresent a rich phenomenology of what it is like to be an embodied agent in a world of artifacts and inexorable physical laws.â Then thereâs todayâs Mickey Mouse Clubhouse:
There are four problems per episode, and each can be solved using one of the four tools [offered by the Handy Dandy machine when a character says âOh Tootles!â]. This assurance is baked into the initial setup of the episode; no moment of helplessness is allowed to arise. There is never an insoluble problem, that is, a deep conflict between the will and the world. I suspect that is one reason these episodes are not just unfunny, but somehow the opposite of funnyâŚ
âŚTo be a Mouseke-doer is to abstract from material reality as depicted in those early Disney cartoons, where we see the flip side of affordances. Perhaps we should call unwanted projectiles, demonic springs, and all such hazards ânegative affordances.â The thing is, you canât have the positive without the negative; they are two sides of the same coin. The world in which we acquire skill as embodied agents is precisely that world in which we are subject to the heteronomy of things; the hazards of material reality. To pursue the fantasy of escaping heteronomy through abstraction is to give up on skill, and therefore to substitute technology-as-magic for the possibility of real agency.
This is, of course, just a kidâs show, but Crawfordâs point is that one, this is what weâre raising our kids to expect, and two, actual technology promises this, too: âAs we âbuild a smarter planetâ (as the IBM advertisements say), the world will become as frictionless as thought itself; âsmartness will subdue dumb nature. But perhaps even thinking will become unnecessary: a fully smart technology should be able to leap in and anticipate our will, using algorithms that discover the person revealed by our previous behavior.â
Crawford published the book in 2016. He anticipated by nine years the advertisements for any number of AI agents that promise to anticipate and do everything for us so that we can⌠what, exactly?
Which is fine, sometimes great even, except that, as Crawford argues, the more we expect technology to do things for us, the less we pay attention. He points to Mercedesâ driver assist features and the inconvenient fact that roads designed to be safe are home to more accidents. âEmily Anthes writes that among traffic engineersâ:
In the last decade or so, a few iconoclasts have begun making roads more hazardousânarrowing them, reducing visibility, and removing curbs, center lines, guardrails, and even traffic signs and signals. These roads, research shows, are home to significantly fewer crashes and traffic fatalities.
Mickey Mouse and roads are extreme examples. The roads have clear consequences and measurable statistics. But I think that our ability to engage in almost everything with less attention has an equally significant, if less measurable, impact on our felt sense of meaning.
If your phone holds a world of entertainment an armâs length away, why engage in conversation? If ChatGPT reveals all of the answers at the tap of a few keys, why think? Better yet, if it can do that annoying work your boss assigned you, why do it?
With each reach for the convenient â each engagement with Baudrillardâs third order simulacra â we give away a little bit of our attention, and a little bit of our agency.
And sometimes, that is a fine trade to make! Even Han and Baudrillard would agree that there are many things we do that are not worthy of our time, attention, or agency. While Han and Baudrillard would disagree, Borgmann and Crawford, I think, would agree that using technology as a tool can help us move past things that arenât really worth doing to focus on the things that are. People have annoying responsibilities. Removing yourself from the system is impractical and undesirable.
The question, then, is what you choose to pay attention to instead.
Because now we have cars that not only assist us, but drive us. I was in San Francisco last week and I took half a dozen Waymo rides. I love it. And the stats suggest self-driving cars really are safer. But instead of driving, do you scroll Twitter or TikTok? Or do you meditate, think, call your parents, or simply take in the neighborhoods as you drive through?
Twitter and TikTok often win. Twitter wins for me too often, which is why I have to delete it.
âOdell [Jenny, author of How to Do Nothing] believes that periodically stepping away is a temporary, not permanent break from reality: a sort of mental reset that reminds us what our lives are really for. But this reminds me of the social media addicts who cycle through deleting and re-installing apps on their phone,â Nadia Asparouhova writes, not at me specifically but at me, in Antimemetics, âInstead of learning to cultivate a fluid sense of control in the world theyâve been given.â
Nadia explains that sheâs unsatisfied by Odellâs calls to âextricate ourselves from this systemâ as âa means of reclaiming our attention, but in a way that seems disconnected from our responsibilities to the network.â
Here, she may as well be writing a response to Han: the answer is not to steal away to a contemplative life, but to engage with the world in order to make it one we want to live in.
In Antimemetics, and in a conversation with Jackson Dahl on Dialectic, Nadia provides the best argument for engaged attention this side of DFW. In both, she reframes attention from a thing that we must fight to protect from forces beyond our control to a magical power that we can wield.
Nadia writes (emphasis mine):
Attention is not something we merely own; it is what we are. Learning to wield it isnât just about returning to the âpresent moment,â but rather about creating infinite, dazzling realities â because what we choose to see in the present moment is unique to each of us.
I want to talk about us as magical wizards of attention, capable of waving a wand and transforming our worlds in astonishing ways. That seems a lot more fun to me than playing slots at the casino.
The world, after all, is more than just what we inherit. Itâs what we choose to notice, nurture, and build. Everything around us â for worse, yes, but also for the better â is made up of where we direct our attention. If we learn to channel it wisely, we can decide what type of future we want to see.
Closing the Gap
Two popular, opposing beliefs dominate the modern narrative around technology.
One argues that we are the victims of a heartless system - call it capitalism, neoliberalism, technology, or whatever the boogeyman of the day is â and that the best we can do, if we can do anything at all, is to retreat. This belief is deeply pessimistic; it paints individuals as impotent cogs in a heartless machine. It offers diagnoses, often accurate ones, but no solutions.
The other argues that technology will solve all of our problems. This falls short, too. While I am a capitalist and a techno-optimist, I believe that the best technology can do is provide means. It can help us live longer, healthier lives, see more of the world and eventually the universe, and free us from dull, repetitive work so that we can do whatever we wish.
Contra Han and Baudrillard, I believe that more means, while potentially making it harder to find meaning, are inherently good.
Ramanujan died of Tuberculosis, after spells in dreary, moldy English sanitoriums. The onset may have been caused by his inability to get Vitamin D, far as he, a vegetarian, was from South Indian food and South Indian sun. At the time, milk was not yet enriched with Vitamin D. His wifeâs letters barely reached him. Communication with home was slow and inconsistent. When he finally arrived back in India, he was sick, shriveled, and angry. Then he died, at just thirty-two. With another half-century of leisure, who knows what he would have given the world?
It is an illusion, Han says, âThat more capital produces more life, which means a greater capacity for living.â Count me in the camp who would prefer more life, more years for more Ramanujans, so that we might figure out how to do more living. Life doesnât necessarily equal aliveness, but death guarantees its absence. Baudrillardâs contention that we are already dead, or whatever, is cute wordplay that fails in the face of lived experience.
DFW, too, predicted the possibility that, if we kept letting ourselves be passively entertained instead of making hard choices minute-by-minute, âthen (a) as individuals, weâre gonna die, and (b) the cultureâs gonna grind to a halt.â But he left open an if, a choice.
While his technological prognostications have proven prescient, we are not dead yet. I am writing this. You are reading it. We are alive.
By arguing that, that self-evidence to the contrary, we are already dead, Baudrillard falls into the same trap of which he accuses society: analysis at the expense of the real.
To me, his analysis, and Hanâs, smacks not of the end of the world, but of late stage materialism, of the last gasps of the belief that whatâs real comes from matter, that consciousness is a weak and secondary thing.
But consciousness is the thing. Attention is what we are.
Meaning isn't found in things. It never has been, and never will be. We create it through attention.
A newspaper under a mall food court table is garbage to most people, destiny to one.
A preacherâs sermon is blandly meaningless to most people, deeply meaningful to one.
Both Irrelevant Chris and the Christian Girlfriend stayed alive long enough to find the thing that brought them meaning. Neither had to farm every day for their food; both had the leisure, however small, to put themselves in meaningâs path.
This is the great challenge of the modern era, and of all future eras: to shrink the gap between means and meaning as our means continue to grow.
There will be depressed people on Mars. Others will take supersonic planes halfway around the world for an Instagram photo. Others still will be cured of cancer only to continue an unhappy life for an extra two or three decades. When the machines provide every human with the opportunity to choose what to do, some will choose to do nothing, to sleep their lives away. Humans are âdivinely discontent.â
We will always ask, âCool, now what?â
But it is far better to have the opportunity to grow our sense of meaning to match our means than to shrink it to the limits of limited means. Han and Baudrillard romanticize what was in reality a brutish past by failing to consider the individuals.
You could imagine a simple formula for total meaning.
Total Meaning = Number of Human Hours * % of Hours Spent Meaningfully
Technology will increase the number of human hours (assuming Elonâs Companions and their third order simulacra siblings donât accelerate the population decline that he warns about). More people will be able to live longer lives. The question is whether we spend those hours more or less meaningfully, whether we spend them as the burnt-out, auto-exploiting automatons Han and Baudrillard view us as, or whether we choose to pay attention.
Attention is a more tractable problem than meaning, which is vague and personal, and my hypothesis is that directing the former increases the latter.
So it is up to us, to you specifically, for yourself, to to build up some machinery, inside our guts, to help us deal with this. It is up to you to be the wizard of your own attention.
How?
I think it starts with Nadiaâs reframing. As she told Jackson on Dialectic:
This is where I really want to drive home that when we talk about the buying and selling of attention online, it's often framed as, "This person owns my attention now" or "This person will own my attention." But you can own your own attention. You can also do cool things with it and make crazy experiences.
She talks about her experience doing the jhanas, which helped her realize that, âIf you don't want to feel a certain way about something, you can actually just not feel that way if you want to. You can move around the little levers in your mind. Attention is crazy.â Stuck in traffic or at the DMV, sheâll ask herself, âHow can I make this the most joyous moment possible?â Doing that moves an hour from the negative to the positive in our â% of hours spent meaningfullyâ variable.
Personally, Iâve been doing little things, although Iâm not perfect.
I didnât only delete my Twitter app, I replaced the doomscroll impulse with an impulse to read. I would not have read Han, Baudrillard, Crawford, Borgmann, DFW, and others over the past few weeks if I hadnât. Engaging deeply with this idea thatâs been floating in my brain has felt meaningful. Instead of asking Claude for an answer, I ask it for a book recommendation.
On weekend mornings, I take my kids to get croissants and go to the playground. Last weekend, on a particularly sunny morning, I caught myself just staring at the sun hitting the leaves.
I meditate at least twenty minutes a day, if only to get myself in the focusing mood.
After getting too locked into the COVID-mode of Zooming whenever possible, I got a small office in the city and try to meet with people in-person whenever possible, ideally for a long walking meeting with no set end time.
In everything I do, Iâm trying to do fewer, better. This is my first essay in three weeks.
I used to listen to something whenever I was on the move. Now I try to walk without headphones. I try to notice the people I walk past, or the way that light hits a building. Itâs delightful.
And Iâve started noticing little synchronicities, nothing as life-changing as Irrelevant Chris or the Christian Girlfriend experienced, but little things that make the world feel a little more magical.
None of this means that I am now a glowing, meaning-filled ball of pure aura. Iâm a little tired right now, actually, as I write this. Itâs hot outside, and my legs got sticky and sweaty in my pants on the walk in, which felt gross. As soon as I hit send on this essay, Iâm going to be maniacally checking both the views and the twitter likes.
But I do feel happier, even if my circumstances havenât changed much. I love my family, and love that I get to spend time with them every day. Investing in and writing about complex, ambitious businesses that are creating the means with which people have the potential to live better lives feels like exactly what I am supposed to be doing. I get to write this long, philosophical essay in what is ostensibly a tech blog for work. Some of you might even still be reading it.
None of this requires me to drop out of the capitalist system and shun technology. I only get to do all of this because of the capitalist system and technology. If anything, Iâve only gotten more competitive and ambitious since I started paying closer attention. If this is what Iâm here to do, I want to do it as well as I possibly can.
Any critique of modern society that blames a faceless system and shrugs its shoulders is, if interesting, useless.
The beauty of the system that Han and Baudrillard dismiss is that it creates markets for solutions. Individual attention faces weapons-grade distractions, and will demand industrial-grade support. My model here is climate change: turning off your AC doesnât solve the problem, solar, nuclear, and batteries are.
I suspect that there is an opportunity for something similar here, even if it doesnât look like âtechnologyâ as we currently define it. Itâs not surprising, for example, that religion is making a comeback, and I would love to see more funding for consciousness and non-materialist research. As Nikola Tesla said, âThe day science begins to study non-physical phenomena, it will make more progress in one decade than in all the previous centuries of its existence.â Understanding and expanding our wizard powers is so much more interesting to me than making simulacra of our brains.
What I am after is the growth of both means and meaning. Not Boring started as a newsletter about technology businesses, but the main question is: how do we make being a human more amazing?
Technology is part of the answer, but itâs not the whole answer. Thatâs why, as you may have noticed, Iâve gotten a little more philosophical and even mystical over the past year or so.
It feels more urgent now. AI is the final boss of technologies that Baudrillard, Asimov, Crawford, and DFW warned us about. We can either use it to create space to become more human or to turn our agency and attention over to the machines. It can become a second-order or third-order simulacrum.
AI will neither kill us nor save us. Technology will neither kill us nor save us. The system will neither kill us nor save us. What happens next is up to us.
So bring on the flying cars and the self-driving ones. Bring on atomic energy, both fission and fusion. Bring on the drones and supersonic planes. Bring on the factories that build houses and the cloud seeders that make it rain. Bring on the robots that do the things we donât want to so we can do whatever we wish.
Bring on the means. We will bring the meaning.
This is the greatest challenge of our era, and our greatest opportunity.
Thatâs all for today. Weâll be back in your inbox on Friday with a Weekly Dose.
Thanks for reading,
Packy
I loved reading this. This definitely feels like a synchronicity, Iâve been thinking a lot about Jean Baudrillardâs simulacra and Maslowâs theory lately.
I see Maslowâs hierarchy of needs as a distillation of the chakra system for the Western mind. He even added self-transcendence later on. In the chakra system, there are seven (simplified) chakras: three below, connected to the material world, and three above, connected to higher realms â all joined in the heart. And the saying goes, âas above, so below.â
Iâve been struggling to understand what that really means until recently.
What Iâm noticing is that progress isnât always linear; it can be more like a leap. As we benefit from technological progress, some of us are starting to feel a pull inward seeking meaning and learning to listen to our own inner guidance (in whatever way works for us). While it can be tempting to stay in that reflective space (intellectual contemplation) there comes a natural urge to bring those insights back into the world: to create and act from a place of deeper alignment, following the principle of âas above, so below.â
To me, thatâs the core of it: allowing space for contemplation, but instead of living there, starting to align it with action in the world, however small it may be. It might be messy at first, but thatâs how we humans find new forms and evolve. So rather than escaping the simulacra, itâs about rebuilding it from the fringes. The more infrastructure we create in the real world from this place of alignment, the more others will be able to join in.
Total Meaning = Number of Human Hours * % of Hours Spent Meaningfully is a profound metric you have there Packy, a subjective, sublime statistic. More meaningful hours to become more meaningful days, weeks and months and eventually lifetimes of meaning. Hail Solipsism!