Okay, this was a fun and very interesting thesis. Having retired from a business that was primarily a service platform (not 100% SaaS, but close), with multiple rounds of financing and evaluation, and shareholder entrances and exits, before IPO, it was very interesting to read about the different ways to look at these shareholder impacts.
Interesting take on why capital intensity shouldn’t scare off great hardware engineers pushing the envelope —it should attract the right ones and adjusting how venture capital is formed around these companies is the key. In aerospace and defense, it’s not just about building the hardware—it’s about ensuring that infrastructure and software scale alongside it. Many aerospace startups are gaining traction in this area giving high-capex teams the visibility and velocity they need to operate like software companies as well, even when building physical systems. Capital-intensive doesn’t have to mean they are slow to innovate.
Okay, this was a fun and very interesting thesis. Having retired from a business that was primarily a service platform (not 100% SaaS, but close), with multiple rounds of financing and evaluation, and shareholder entrances and exits, before IPO, it was very interesting to read about the different ways to look at these shareholder impacts.
Thanks Greg!
Interesting take on why capital intensity shouldn’t scare off great hardware engineers pushing the envelope —it should attract the right ones and adjusting how venture capital is formed around these companies is the key. In aerospace and defense, it’s not just about building the hardware—it’s about ensuring that infrastructure and software scale alongside it. Many aerospace startups are gaining traction in this area giving high-capex teams the visibility and velocity they need to operate like software companies as well, even when building physical systems. Capital-intensive doesn’t have to mean they are slow to innovate.